id,collection,Type de document,DOI,Titre,Auteur(s),Titre de la revue,Numéro,Pagination,Éditeur,Date de publication,ISSN,Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais,Discipline(s) HAL,Résumé en anglais,Langue,Vulgarisation
"b386e985-2a06-466c-bda4-e284245bd901","20.500.12210/61","Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage","10.1111/jsbm.12308","Managerial Incentives and Investment Policy in Family Firms: Evidence from a Structural Analysis","Wu, Betty||Mazur, Mieszko","Journal of Small Business Management","56||4","618 - 657","Blackwell Publishing","2018-10","0047-2778",,"Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management",,"Anglais","Non"
"578a4fca-ceed-4ec3-b178-29bc0fd5705b","20.500.12210/61","Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage","10.1111/jsbm.12237","Founding Family Firms, CEO Incentive Pay, and Dual Agency Problems","Mazur, Mieszko||Wu, Betty H.T.","Journal of Small Business Management","54||4","1099-1125","Blackwell Publishing","2016-10","0047-2778",,"Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management","This paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by examining relations between family involvement and CEO compensation. Using a panel of 362 small U.S. listed firms, we analyze how founding families influence firm performance through option portfolio price sensitivity. Consistent with the dual agency framework, we find that family firms have lower CEO incentive pay, which is further reduced by higher executive ownership. Interestingly, such incentive pay offsets the positive impact that families have on firm valuation. Collectively, our results show that, compared with nonfamily firms, lower incentive pay adopted by family firms due to lower agency costs mitigates the direct effect of family involvement on firm performance. Once accounting for CEO incentive pay, we do not observe performance differences between family and nonfamily firms.","Anglais","Non"
"19ab2343-033b-479b-a9b0-343412298aa0","20.500.12210/61","Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage","10.1016/j.qref.2018.11.003","The effect of executive stock option delta and vega on the spin-off decision","Mazur, Mieszko||Salganik-Shoshan, Galla","Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance",,,"Elsevier","2018-11-08","1062-9769","Spin-off||Divestiture||Stock option delta||Stock option vega||Executive compensation||Firm risk||Firm value","Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management","We investigate the role of CEO incentives around asset restructuring known as corporate spin-off. More specifically, we focus on executive stock option delta and vega vis-à-vis changes in firm value and firm riskiness in response to the corporate spin-off. Controlling for self-selection of the spin-off decision, we find that executive stock option vega is positively related to changes in firm value as well as changes in firm risk. Conversely, we find that executive stock option delta is negatively related to changes in firm value and firm risk. Finally, we estimate the Fazzari et al. (1988) investment model and show that at the business segment level, CEO incentives are positively linked to capital spending. Overall, our study extends the current literature by documenting the role of executive stock option delta and vega in the context of corporate spin-offs.","Anglais","Non"
"81eb273a-4ddc-4f35-8cde-66409d06d263","20.500.12210/61","Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage","10.1016/j.finmar.2018.05.002","Proximity and litigation: Evidence from the geographic location of institutional investors","Mazur, Mieszko||Salganik-Shoshan, Galla||Walker, Thomas||Wang, Jun","Journal of Financial Markets","40","60-74","Elsevier","2018-09","1386-4181",,"Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management","In this paper, we examine how the geographic distance between a firm and its largest institutional investors affects the firm's litigation risk. We show that geographic proximity between the firm and its largest institutional shareholders reduces the incidence of a lawsuit. Moreover, we find that geographic proximity affects the relationship between institutional investors' ownership and the litigation risk of their portfolio firms. These findings indicate that geographically proximate investors may have an informational advantage over investors who are located far away, and that this advantage manifests itself in more effective monitoring of firm management, and consequently, in lower litigation risk.","Anglais","Non"
"ee2a6396-3c10-4bbf-88a9-0074ed4dc7ff","20.500.12210/61","Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage","10.1016/j.frl.2016.12.031","Comparing performance sensitivity of retail and institutional mutual funds’ investment flows","Mazur, Mieszko||Salganik-Shoshan, Galla||Zagonov, Maxim","Finance Research Letters","22","66-73","Elsevier","2017-08","1544-6123","Flow-performance relationship||Institutional funds||Retail funds||Mutual fund flows||Performance evaluation","Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management","In this paper, we examine and compare the form of the flow-performance relationship for U.S. retail and institutional mutual funds. We provide evidence that the convex form of the flow-performance function documented by previous research characterizes mostly the relationship in the upper region of the performance scale. In contrast, the flow-performance relationship for the low-performance region appears to be concave. Furthermore, we document that the observed convexity is more pronounced for retail funds, while the concavity can be mainly attributed to institutional funds.","Anglais","Non"
"e91ab5ee-3a74-4d80-bfda-01f53d9e366f","20.500.12210/61","Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage","10.1016/j.finmar.2016.12.001","Teaming up and quiet intervention: The impact of institutional investors on executive compensation policies","Mazur, Mieszko||Salganik-Shoshan, Galla","Journal of Financial Markets","35","65-83","Elsevier","2017-09","1386-4181","Institutional investors||Executive compensation||Strategic interactions||Executive pay disparity||Geography","Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management","In this paper, we investigate whether institutional investors intervene in firms in order to impact their incentive systems. We use metrics based on geographic distance between institutional investors as proxies for the intensity of their strategic interactions and plausible interventions. We find that when investors are geographically proximate to one another, firms tend to adopt executive compensation contracts that exhibit more performance-based mechanisms, higher incentives to expend managerial effort, and higher incentives to make risky and positive NPV policy choices. We also find that geographic distance between institutions is a significant determinant of the executive pay differentials.","Anglais","Non"
