Title :

An experimental comparison of contributions in collective prevention games and public goods games

Author(s) :

Flambard, Véronique [Auteur]
Université catholique de Lille [UCL]
Institut Catholique de Lille [ICL]
Université Catholique de Lille - Faculté de gestion, économie et sciences [UCL FGES]
Centre de recherches économiques sociologiques et de gestion [Lille] [CRESGE]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire des transitions de Lille [LITL]
Le Lec, Fabrice [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Romaniuc, Rustam [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]

Journal title :

Economic Inquiry

Pages :

1598-1617

Publisher :

Wiley

Publication date :

2024-06-24

ISSN :

0095-2583

HAL domain(s) :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

English abstract : [en]

In many collective action problems individuals' contributions increase the probability of a collectively favorable event rather than affect the quantity of public goods provided. Such problems, that we refer to as collective ...
Show more >In many collective action problems individuals' contributions increase the probability of a collectively favorable event rather than affect the quantity of public goods provided. Such problems, that we refer to as collective prevention games, remain largely unexplored in the literature. We fill this gap by setting up an experiment where subjects' contributions increase the probability of a fixed collective benefit or reduce the probability of a fixed negative externality. Our main result is a substantial increase in cooperation in the probabilistic loss environment compared to the deterministic one. We explore some behavioral mechanisms that could drive this result.Show less >

Language :

Anglais

Peer reviewed article :

Oui

Audience :

Internationale

Popular science :

Non

Collections :

• Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL

Submission date :

2025-01-22T03:09:46Z