Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation ...
Document type :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
DOI :
Title :
Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show
Author(s) :
Turmunkh, Uyanga [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
van den Assem, Martijn [Auteur]
van Dolder, Dennie [Auteur]
University of Nottingham, UK [UON]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
van den Assem, Martijn [Auteur]
van Dolder, Dennie [Auteur]
University of Nottingham, UK [UON]
Journal title :
Management Science
Publisher :
INFORMS
Publication date :
2019-03-27
ISSN :
0025-1909
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
English abstract : [en]
We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from ...
Show more >We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk.Show less >
Show more >We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Popular science :
Non
Collections :
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