Does Restricting Outsiders Always Lower ...
Type de document :
Article dans une revue scientifique
Titre :
Does Restricting Outsiders Always Lower Price and Benefit Insiders?
Auteur(s) :
Lai, Tat-Kei [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Ng, Travis [Auteur]
The Chinese University of Hong Kong [Hong Kong]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Ng, Travis [Auteur]
The Chinese University of Hong Kong [Hong Kong]
Titre de la revue :
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
Pagination :
153-178
Éditeur :
Springer Verlag
Date de publication :
2022-01
ISSN :
0895-5638
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Product quality
Customer restrictions
Vertical restraints
Foreign restrictions
Discrimination
Customer restrictions
Vertical restraints
Foreign restrictions
Discrimination
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Résumé en anglais : [en]
Policies that restrict outsiders are common. Some justifications include protecting insiders from high price and leaving more of the concerned products to insiders. Sometimes these policies fail to work because outsiders ...
Lire la suite >Policies that restrict outsiders are common. Some justifications include protecting insiders from high price and leaving more of the concerned products to insiders. Sometimes these policies fail to work because outsiders can get around the restrictions. In a model in which a policy of restricting outsiders is anticipated, we find that if the policy works, it only sometimes lowers the price. When the price does decrease, the product quality decreases too. Not every insider would benefit equally; those insiders who likely suffer are identified. While restricting outsiders may or may not reduce insiders’ consumer surplus, outsiders and the producer are always worse off. They therefore would find ways to get around the restrictions. Evaluating these policies must (a) take into account the possibility that they might not work at all, (b) check their effects beyond just price if they do work.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >Policies that restrict outsiders are common. Some justifications include protecting insiders from high price and leaving more of the concerned products to insiders. Sometimes these policies fail to work because outsiders can get around the restrictions. In a model in which a policy of restricting outsiders is anticipated, we find that if the policy works, it only sometimes lowers the price. When the price does decrease, the product quality decreases too. Not every insider would benefit equally; those insiders who likely suffer are identified. While restricting outsiders may or may not reduce insiders’ consumer surplus, outsiders and the producer are always worse off. They therefore would find ways to get around the restrictions. Evaluating these policies must (a) take into account the possibility that they might not work at all, (b) check their effects beyond just price if they do work.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Comité de lecture :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :