Yardstick competition: which neighbours matter?
Document type :
Article dans une revue scientifique
Permalink :
Title :
Yardstick competition: which neighbours matter?
Author(s) :
Dubois, Eric [Auteur]
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques et Sociales - UMR 8026 [CERAPS]
Paty, Sonia [Auteur]
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques et Sociales - UMR 8026 [CERAPS]
Paty, Sonia [Auteur]
Journal title :
Annals of Regional Science
Abbreviated title :
Ann. reg. sci.
Pages :
433-452
Publisher :
Springer Verlag (Germany)
Publication date :
2010-06
ISSN :
0570-1864
Keyword(s) :
Yardstick competition
French local governments
Vote-function
Local taxation
Municipal elections
French local governments
Vote-function
Local taxation
Municipal elections
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
English abstract : [en]
This paper aims at testing the existence of yardstick competition by estimating a fully specified vote-function on a panel data set of 104 French local governments from 1989 to 2001. When comparing the performance of their ...
Show more >This paper aims at testing the existence of yardstick competition by estimating a fully specified vote-function on a panel data set of 104 French local governments from 1989 to 2001. When comparing the performance of their incumbent to the one of their "neighbours", voters might consider their close geographical neighbours but also the nearby cities that are similar according to some socio-economic characteristics such as population size. The estimation results show that voters sanction their incumbent if their own local housing tax is high. Moreover, we find that voters reward their incumbent when neighbouring cities that are similar in terms of demographic characteristics have high local taxes.Show less >
Show more >This paper aims at testing the existence of yardstick competition by estimating a fully specified vote-function on a panel data set of 104 French local governments from 1989 to 2001. When comparing the performance of their incumbent to the one of their "neighbours", voters might consider their close geographical neighbours but also the nearby cities that are similar according to some socio-economic characteristics such as population size. The estimation results show that voters sanction their incumbent if their own local housing tax is high. Moreover, we find that voters reward their incumbent when neighbouring cities that are similar in terms of demographic characteristics have high local taxes.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Audience :
Internationale
Popular science :
Non
Collections :
Submission date :
2019-11-04T10:22:33Z
2022-01-03T13:51:32Z
2022-01-03T13:51:32Z
Files
- document
- Open access
- Access the document