Yardstick competition: which neighbours matter?
Type de document :
Article dans une revue scientifique
URL permanente :
Titre :
Yardstick competition: which neighbours matter?
Auteur(s) :
Dubois, Eric [Auteur]
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques et Sociales - UMR 8026 [CERAPS]
Paty, Sonia [Auteur]
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques et Sociales - UMR 8026 [CERAPS]
Paty, Sonia [Auteur]
Titre de la revue :
Annals of Regional Science
Nom court de la revue :
Ann. reg. sci.
Pagination :
433-452
Éditeur :
Springer Verlag (Germany)
Date de publication :
2010-06
ISSN :
0570-1864
Mot(s)-clé(s) :
Yardstick competition
French local governments
Vote-function
Local taxation
Municipal elections
French local governments
Vote-function
Local taxation
Municipal elections
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Résumé en anglais : [en]
This paper aims at testing the existence of yardstick competition by estimating a fully specified vote-function on a panel data set of 104 French local governments from 1989 to 2001. When comparing the performance of their ...
Lire la suite >This paper aims at testing the existence of yardstick competition by estimating a fully specified vote-function on a panel data set of 104 French local governments from 1989 to 2001. When comparing the performance of their incumbent to the one of their "neighbours", voters might consider their close geographical neighbours but also the nearby cities that are similar according to some socio-economic characteristics such as population size. The estimation results show that voters sanction their incumbent if their own local housing tax is high. Moreover, we find that voters reward their incumbent when neighbouring cities that are similar in terms of demographic characteristics have high local taxes.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >This paper aims at testing the existence of yardstick competition by estimating a fully specified vote-function on a panel data set of 104 French local governments from 1989 to 2001. When comparing the performance of their incumbent to the one of their "neighbours", voters might consider their close geographical neighbours but also the nearby cities that are similar according to some socio-economic characteristics such as population size. The estimation results show that voters sanction their incumbent if their own local housing tax is high. Moreover, we find that voters reward their incumbent when neighbouring cities that are similar in terms of demographic characteristics have high local taxes.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Audience :
Internationale
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Date de dépôt :
2019-11-04T10:22:33Z
2022-01-03T13:51:32Z
2022-01-03T13:51:32Z
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