Tradable climate liabilities: A thought experiment
Type de document :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Titre :
Tradable climate liabilities: A thought experiment
Auteur(s) :
Billette De Villemeur, Etienne [Auteur]
EMLyon Business School [EM]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Leroux, Justin [Auteur]
HEC Montréal [HEC Montréal]
EMLyon Business School [EM]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Leroux, Justin [Auteur]
HEC Montréal [HEC Montréal]
Titre de la revue :
Ecological Economics
Pagination :
106355
Éditeur :
Elsevier
Date de publication :
2019-10
ISSN :
0921-8009
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Climate liability
Market instruments
Pigovian tax
Risk sharing
Market instruments
Pigovian tax
Risk sharing
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Résumé en anglais : [en]
We envision the creation of a climate liability market to address climate change. Each period, countries are issued liability commensurate to their emissions of the period. Liability bearers are required to pay over time, ...
Lire la suite >We envision the creation of a climate liability market to address climate change. Each period, countries are issued liability commensurate to their emissions of the period. Liability bearers are required to pay over time, as climate harm materializes. Revenues are used to compensate participating countries in proportion of climate harm. Because liabilities are traded like financial debt among participants, the mechanism achieves a unique carbon price through decentralization of the choice of a discount rate as well as beliefs about the severity of the climate problem. We discuss properties of such a mechanism along the dimensions of efficiency, fairness, exposure to risk, commitment, participation, as well as implementation challenges.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >We envision the creation of a climate liability market to address climate change. Each period, countries are issued liability commensurate to their emissions of the period. Liability bearers are required to pay over time, as climate harm materializes. Revenues are used to compensate participating countries in proportion of climate harm. Because liabilities are traded like financial debt among participants, the mechanism achieves a unique carbon price through decentralization of the choice of a discount rate as well as beliefs about the severity of the climate problem. We discuss properties of such a mechanism along the dimensions of efficiency, fairness, exposure to risk, commitment, participation, as well as implementation challenges.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :
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- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106355
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