The stickiness of norms

Farrow, Katherine; Romaniuc, Rustam

Document type :

Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage

DOI :

10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010

Title :

The stickiness of norms

Author(s) :

Farrow, Katherine [Auteur]
EconomiX [EconomiX]
Romaniuc, Rustam [Auteur]

Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]

Journal title :

International Review of Law and Economics

Pages :

54-62

Publisher :

Elsevier [1981-....]

Publication date :

2019-06

ISSN :

0144-8188

English keyword(s) :

Social norms
Peer punishment
Saving face
Cooperation

HAL domain(s) :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

English abstract : [en]

In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions ...
Show more >In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions in which a prosocial norm of cooperation is enforced via either anonymous peer punishment or face-saving concerns. In two test treatments, we introduce to these social environments an external regulation that is implemented for a limited period of time and then removed. We observe a significant negative post-intervention effect of this removal in the context of peer disapproval, but no such effect in the context of face-saving concerns. Our findings reveal the importance of the type of norm-enforcement mechanism in determining the robustness of norm adherence in the long term.Show less >

Language :

Anglais

Popular science :

Non

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