The cost of CEO duality: Evidence from ...
Document type :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Title :
The cost of CEO duality: Evidence from French leadership compensation
Author(s) :
Broye, Géraldine [Auteur]
École de Management de Strasbourg = EM Strasbourg Business School [EM Strasbourg]
François, Abel [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Moulin, Yves [Auteur]
Centre Européen de Recherche en Economie Financière et Gestion des Entreprises [CEREFIGE]
École de Management de Strasbourg = EM Strasbourg Business School [EM Strasbourg]
François, Abel [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Moulin, Yves [Auteur]
Centre Européen de Recherche en Economie Financière et Gestion des Entreprises [CEREFIGE]
Journal title :
European Management Journal
Pages :
336 - 350
Publisher :
Elsevier
Publication date :
2017-06
ISSN :
0263-2373
English keyword(s) :
Corporate governance
Executive compensation
Duality
Chairperson of the board
France
Executive compensation
Duality
Chairperson of the board
France
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management
English abstract : [en]
This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between board leadership structures and executive compensation. According to agency theory, the combined position of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (COB) ...
Show more >This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between board leadership structures and executive compensation. According to agency theory, the combined position of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (COB) entails greater compensation for the CEO in order to reduce conflicts of interest. In the literature, combined board structure is generally considered to generate additional costs for companies. However, the choice of two separate structures implies the payment of incentive compensation for the COB in addition to that defined for the CEO. This paper investigates the financial cost of duality when compensation packages are set for both leaders. Our results suggest that although combined board structure is associated with higher incentive compensation for the CEO, the overall compensation cost to the company is no higher when the chairperson's compensation is considered.Show less >
Show more >This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between board leadership structures and executive compensation. According to agency theory, the combined position of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (COB) entails greater compensation for the CEO in order to reduce conflicts of interest. In the literature, combined board structure is generally considered to generate additional costs for companies. However, the choice of two separate structures implies the payment of incentive compensation for the COB in addition to that defined for the CEO. This paper investigates the financial cost of duality when compensation packages are set for both leaders. Our results suggest that although combined board structure is associated with higher incentive compensation for the CEO, the overall compensation cost to the company is no higher when the chairperson's compensation is considered.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Popular science :
Non
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