Optimal term length for an overconfident central banker

Farvaque, Etienne; Matsueda, Norimichi

Type de document :

Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage

DOI :

10.1142/s0217590816500107

Titre :

Optimal term length for an overconfident central banker

Auteur(s) :

Farvaque, Etienne [Auteur]

Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Matsueda, Norimichi [Auteur]

Titre de la revue :

The Singapore Economic Review

Pagination :

179--192

Éditeur :

World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd

Date de publication :

2017-03

ISSN :

0217-5908

Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :

Central banker
overconfidence
legal mandate
optimal term length

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

Résumé en anglais : [en]

This paper discusses the implications of overconfidence when it affects a monetary policy maker. We consider two forms of overconfidence: the illusion of precision and the illusion of control. Incorporating them into a ...
Lire la suite >This paper discusses the implications of overconfidence when it affects a monetary policy maker. We consider two forms of overconfidence: the illusion of precision and the illusion of control. Incorporating them into a standard New Keynesian framework, we consider the optimal term length of a central banker and examine how it depends on the types and degrees of overconfidence. In particular, we show that the legal mandate should always be lengthened when these two types of biases increase by the same percentage magnitude.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Vulgarisation :

Non

Collections :

Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL

Fichiers

http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp106.pdf
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