A dirty deed done dirt cheap: Reporting ...
Type de document :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Titre :
A dirty deed done dirt cheap: Reporting the blame of a national reform on local politicians
Auteur(s) :
Cassette, Aurélie [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie [EQUIPPE]
Farvaque, Etienne [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie [EQUIPPE]
Farvaque, Etienne [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Titre de la revue :
European Journal of Political Economy
Pagination :
127--144
Éditeur :
Elsevier
Date de publication :
2016-06
ISSN :
0176-2680
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Reforms
Elections
Municipalities
School
Elections
Municipalities
School
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Résumé en anglais : [en]
This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school week in France provides the ground for a verification of the ...
Lire la suite >This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school week in France provides the ground for a verification of the attribution of accountability hypothesis, as it was nationally decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger cities. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically. So doing, the central government does a dirty deed to the local ones, for a very cheap cost. That mayors who have announced a boycott of the reform have received electoral gains confirms that some local politicians expected to be the fall guys, bearing the brunt of the costs of the reform.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school week in France provides the ground for a verification of the attribution of accountability hypothesis, as it was nationally decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger cities. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically. So doing, the central government does a dirty deed to the local ones, for a very cheap cost. That mayors who have announced a boycott of the reform have received electoral gains confirms that some local politicians expected to be the fall guys, bearing the brunt of the costs of the reform.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :
Fichiers
- https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67031/1/MPRA_paper_67031.pdf
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