Taming The Shape Shifter: Detecting ...
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès avec actes
Titre :
Taming The Shape Shifter: Detecting Anti-fingerprinting Browsers
Auteur(s) :
Amin Azad, Babak [Auteur]
Department of Computer Science [Stonybrook - NY]
Starov, Oleksii [Auteur]
Palo Alto Networks
Laperdrix, Pierre [Auteur]
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Self-adaptation for distributed services and large software systems [SPIRALS]
Nikiforakis, Nick [Auteur]
Department of Computer Science [Stonybrook - NY]
Department of Computer Science [Stonybrook - NY]
Starov, Oleksii [Auteur]
Palo Alto Networks
Laperdrix, Pierre [Auteur]
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Self-adaptation for distributed services and large software systems [SPIRALS]
Nikiforakis, Nick [Auteur]
Department of Computer Science [Stonybrook - NY]
Titre de la manifestation scientifique :
DIMVA 2020 - 17th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment
Ville :
Lisboa / Virtual
Pays :
Portugal
Date de début de la manifestation scientifique :
2020-06-24
Discipline(s) HAL :
Informatique [cs]/Web
Informatique [cs]/Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]
Informatique [cs]
Informatique [cs]/Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]
Informatique [cs]
Résumé en anglais : [en]
When it comes to leaked credentials and credit card information, we observe the development and use of anti-fingerprinting browsers by malicious actors. These tools are carefully designed to evade detection, often by ...
Lire la suite >When it comes to leaked credentials and credit card information, we observe the development and use of anti-fingerprinting browsers by malicious actors. These tools are carefully designed to evade detection, often by mimicking the browsing environment of the victim whose credentials were stolen. Even though these tools are popular in the underground markets, they have not received enough attention by researchers. In this paper, we report on the first evaluation of four underground, commercial, and research anti-fingerprinting browsers and highlight their high success rate in bypassing browser fingerprinting. Despite their success against well-known fingerprinting methods and libraries, we show that even slightest variation in the simulated fingerprint compared to the real ones can give away the presence of anti-fingerprinting tools. As a result, we provide techniques and fingerprint-based signatures that can be used to detect the current generation of anti-fingerprinting browsers.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >When it comes to leaked credentials and credit card information, we observe the development and use of anti-fingerprinting browsers by malicious actors. These tools are carefully designed to evade detection, often by mimicking the browsing environment of the victim whose credentials were stolen. Even though these tools are popular in the underground markets, they have not received enough attention by researchers. In this paper, we report on the first evaluation of four underground, commercial, and research anti-fingerprinting browsers and highlight their high success rate in bypassing browser fingerprinting. Despite their success against well-known fingerprinting methods and libraries, we show that even slightest variation in the simulated fingerprint compared to the real ones can give away the presence of anti-fingerprinting tools. As a result, we provide techniques and fingerprint-based signatures that can be used to detect the current generation of anti-fingerprinting browsers.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Comité de lecture :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :
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- antifpbrowsers-dimva20.pdf
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