Eve, you shall not get access! A cyber-physical ...
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès avec actes
Titre :
Eve, you shall not get access! A cyber-physical blockchain architecture for electronic toll collection security
Auteur(s) :
Didouh, Ahmed [Auteur]
COMmunications NUMériques - IEMN [COMNUM - IEMN]
Institut d’Électronique, de Microélectronique et de Nanotechnologie - UMR 8520 [IEMN]
Lopez, Anthony Bahadir [Auteur]
El Hillali, Yassin [Auteur]
Institut d’Électronique, de Microélectronique et de Nanotechnologie - UMR 8520 [IEMN]
COMmunications NUMériques - IEMN [COMNUM - IEMN]
Rivenq, Atika [Auteur]
INSA Institut National des Sciences Appliquées Hauts-de-France [INSA Hauts-De-France]
Institut d’Électronique, de Microélectronique et de Nanotechnologie - UMR 8520 [IEMN]
COMmunications NUMériques - IEMN [COMNUM - IEMN]
Faruque, Mohammad Abdullah Al [Auteur]
COMmunications NUMériques - IEMN [COMNUM - IEMN]
Institut d’Électronique, de Microélectronique et de Nanotechnologie - UMR 8520 [IEMN]
Lopez, Anthony Bahadir [Auteur]
El Hillali, Yassin [Auteur]

Institut d’Électronique, de Microélectronique et de Nanotechnologie - UMR 8520 [IEMN]
COMmunications NUMériques - IEMN [COMNUM - IEMN]
Rivenq, Atika [Auteur]

INSA Institut National des Sciences Appliquées Hauts-de-France [INSA Hauts-De-France]
Institut d’Électronique, de Microélectronique et de Nanotechnologie - UMR 8520 [IEMN]
COMmunications NUMériques - IEMN [COMNUM - IEMN]
Faruque, Mohammad Abdullah Al [Auteur]
Titre de la manifestation scientifique :
23rd IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, ITSC 2020
Ville :
Rhodes
Pays :
Grèce
Date de début de la manifestation scientifique :
2020-09-20
Titre de la revue :
Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, ITSC 2020
Éditeur :
IEEE
Date de publication :
2020
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Blockchain
Security
Computer architecture
Smart contracts
Public key
Vehicle-to-everything
Standards
Security
Computer architecture
Smart contracts
Public key
Vehicle-to-everything
Standards
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'ingénieur [physics]
Informatique [cs]
Informatique [cs]/Intelligence artificielle [cs.AI]
Informatique [cs]/Réseaux et télécommunications [cs.NI]
Sciences de l'ingénieur [physics]/Traitement du signal et de l'image [eess.SP]
Sciences de l'ingénieur [physics]/Electronique
Informatique [cs]
Informatique [cs]/Intelligence artificielle [cs.AI]
Informatique [cs]/Réseaux et télécommunications [cs.NI]
Sciences de l'ingénieur [physics]/Traitement du signal et de l'image [eess.SP]
Sciences de l'ingénieur [physics]/Electronique
Résumé en anglais : [en]
Cooperative intelligent transportation system (C-ITS) applications are generally susceptible to position spoofing-dependent attacks such as Sybil and DDoS attacks due to a lack of established solutions. This paper presents ...
Lire la suite >Cooperative intelligent transportation system (C-ITS) applications are generally susceptible to position spoofing-dependent attacks such as Sybil and DDoS attacks due to a lack of established solutions. This paper presents a novel cyber-physical blockchain cryptographic architecture to help prevent position spoofing attackers from becoming validated nodes in C-ITS applications. The solution also guarantees security requirements including the non-trivial non-repudiation in light of these and other attacks. With a use case of electronic toll collection (ETC), our architecture implements techniques based on Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) measurements in conjunction with blockchain authentication methods such as Proof-of-Location and smart contracts to determine the legitimacy of a node. We demonstrate our solution in experiments using ITS-G5 Cohda Wireless technology (a Road Side Unit and two On-Board Units programmed with the ITS Vanetza stack) with functionalities specified by the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute (ETSI). From our experimental results from several driving-based data gathering tests, we discovered that our solution is able to cope with noise and relative velocity challenges because it incorporates both OBUs and RSUs in the Proof of Location computation steps. In light of this, the proposed architecture may also be applicable to govern V2X in general.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >Cooperative intelligent transportation system (C-ITS) applications are generally susceptible to position spoofing-dependent attacks such as Sybil and DDoS attacks due to a lack of established solutions. This paper presents a novel cyber-physical blockchain cryptographic architecture to help prevent position spoofing attackers from becoming validated nodes in C-ITS applications. The solution also guarantees security requirements including the non-trivial non-repudiation in light of these and other attacks. With a use case of electronic toll collection (ETC), our architecture implements techniques based on Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) measurements in conjunction with blockchain authentication methods such as Proof-of-Location and smart contracts to determine the legitimacy of a node. We demonstrate our solution in experiments using ITS-G5 Cohda Wireless technology (a Road Side Unit and two On-Board Units programmed with the ITS Vanetza stack) with functionalities specified by the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute (ETSI). From our experimental results from several driving-based data gathering tests, we discovered that our solution is able to cope with noise and relative velocity challenges because it incorporates both OBUs and RSUs in the Proof of Location computation steps. In light of this, the proposed architecture may also be applicable to govern V2X in general.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Comité de lecture :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Vulgarisation :
Non
Commentaire :
ISBN 978-1-7281-4149-7 e-ISBN 978-1-7281-4149-7
Source :
Fichiers
- https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03360239/document
- Accès libre
- Accéder au document
- https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03360239/document
- Accès libre
- Accéder au document
- https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03360239/document
- Accès libre
- Accéder au document
- https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03360239/document
- Accès libre
- Accéder au document
- document
- Accès libre
- Accéder au document
- Ahmed%20Didouh-2020.pdf
- Accès libre
- Accéder au document
- document
- Accès libre
- Accéder au document