Brentano e le aporie dell’‘io sono’ trafilosofia trascendentale e metafisica
Document type :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Title :
Refutazioni egologiche e questionari heideggeriani.
Brentano e le aporie dell’‘io sono’ trafilosofia trascendentale e metafisica
Brentano e le aporie dell’‘io sono’ trafilosofia trascendentale e metafisica
Author(s) :
Journal title :
Alvearium
Pages :
145-182
Publisher :
Centro dipartementale di studi su Descartes "Ettore Lojacono"
Publication date :
2022
ISSN :
2036-5020
English keyword(s) :
Brentano
Heidegger
Descartes
Aristotle
ego
cogito
skepticism
transcendental philosophy
metaphysics
Heidegger
Descartes
Aristotle
ego
cogito
skepticism
transcendental philosophy
metaphysics
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie
English abstract : [en]
In Being and Time, Heidegger presents the whole of post-Cartesian metaphysics as incapable of explicitly adressingthe questionof being as such. He thus describes modern metaphysics as implicitly bound to the quite traditional ...
Show more >In Being and Time, Heidegger presents the whole of post-Cartesian metaphysics as incapable of explicitly adressingthe questionof being as such. He thus describes modern metaphysics as implicitly bound to the quite traditional sense of being as presence, applyed it to the being of the ego cogito now understood as a fundamentum inconcussum. For his part, in his lectures on Metaphysics, Brentano, not unlike Descartes, inends to take up the Aristotelian science of being as such based on the evidence measured by the cogitationes that appear to internal perception. By doing so he thus examines the relationship between ‘ego’ and ‘sum’ on the background of a wide array of skeptical objections. But what then does ego sum mean? More importantly, how far does the analogy between Brentano and Descartes (for whom the ego sum is actually a fundamentum inconcussum) actually go? Finally, in Brentano, is the sense of ‘sum’ relative to such a ‘cogito’ really so implicit? And can it be said that such a sense fully corresponds to the sense of being as being present? Through a detailed reconstruction of the Brentanian argumentsadvanced in his lectures on Metaphysics, we will try to test the limits of Heidegger’s diagnosis of modern metaphysics by asking if and to what extent it actually clarifies the nature of Brentano’s project or, instead, conceals some of its most original aspects.Show less >
Show more >In Being and Time, Heidegger presents the whole of post-Cartesian metaphysics as incapable of explicitly adressingthe questionof being as such. He thus describes modern metaphysics as implicitly bound to the quite traditional sense of being as presence, applyed it to the being of the ego cogito now understood as a fundamentum inconcussum. For his part, in his lectures on Metaphysics, Brentano, not unlike Descartes, inends to take up the Aristotelian science of being as such based on the evidence measured by the cogitationes that appear to internal perception. By doing so he thus examines the relationship between ‘ego’ and ‘sum’ on the background of a wide array of skeptical objections. But what then does ego sum mean? More importantly, how far does the analogy between Brentano and Descartes (for whom the ego sum is actually a fundamentum inconcussum) actually go? Finally, in Brentano, is the sense of ‘sum’ relative to such a ‘cogito’ really so implicit? And can it be said that such a sense fully corresponds to the sense of being as being present? Through a detailed reconstruction of the Brentanian argumentsadvanced in his lectures on Metaphysics, we will try to test the limits of Heidegger’s diagnosis of modern metaphysics by asking if and to what extent it actually clarifies the nature of Brentano’s project or, instead, conceals some of its most original aspects.Show less >
Language :
Italien
Popular science :
Non
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