Gas Trading with Tariff Versus Sanction as a Networked Game

Pokou, Fredy; Fochesato, Marta; Le Cadre, Hélène

Document type :

Communication dans un congrès avec actes

Title :

Gas Trading with Tariff Versus Sanction as a Networked Game

Author(s) :

Pokou, Fredy [Auteur]
Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure [INOCS]
Fochesato, Marta [Auteur]
Le Cadre, Hélène [Auteur]
Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure [INOCS]

Conference title :

33rd EURO Conference

Conference organizers(s) :

Technical University of Denmark (DTU)

City :

Copenhagen

Country :

Danemark

Start date of the conference :

2024-06-30

Publication date :

2024-03-01

HAL domain(s) :

Mathématiques [math]/Optimisation et contrôle [math.OC]

English abstract : [en]

The economies of many geographic markets are dependent on fossil fuels, e.g., gas. Due togeopolitical tensions, some geographic markets may decide to partially or totally halt their gastrades. We therefore propose a model ...
Show more >The economies of many geographic markets are dependent on fossil fuels, e.g., gas. Due togeopolitical tensions, some geographic markets may decide to partially or totally halt their gastrades. We therefore propose a model which casts the optimal taxation problem as a networkedgame in two settings: a) perfect competition, where a global market operator is responsible foradjusting the export prices, leading to a partial equilibrium; b) a variational approach, wherethe export prices are determined endogenously as dual variables of the supply-demand balances.Our model is built on an agent based representation of suppliers and generators interacting in acertain number of geographic markets. We aim to assess the impact of tariffs or sanctions on thegeographic markets’ imports of gas and on their utility. To that purpose, the optimal taxationproblem is framed as a Stackelberg game where a regulator at the upper level is responsible forthe sanction definition considering different criteria, while the geographic market at the lowerlevel reacts by adjusting their exports and trade prices. We derived closed-form expressions forthe export prices, and proved that the Stackelberg equilibria can be explicitely mapped to theperfect competition equilibria. Finally, considering a degree of bounded rationality on the part ofstakeholders, we rely on Prospect Theory to extend the optimal taxation games to in situationsinvolving risks linked to the behavior of other market stakeholders.Show less >

Language :

Anglais

Peer reviewed article :

Oui

Audience :

Internationale

Popular science :

Non

Collections :

Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille (CRIStAL) - UMR 9189

Source :

Harvested from HAL

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