Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too ...
Type de document :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Titre :
Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!”Popularity Gains as an Incentive to Legislate Frantically?
Auteur(s) :
Boukari, Mamadou [Auteur]
Cakpo-Tozo, Daniel [Auteur]
Farvaque, Etienne [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Cakpo-Tozo, Daniel [Auteur]
Farvaque, Etienne [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Titre de la revue :
Economics Bulletin
Pagination :
1488-1507
Éditeur :
Economics Bulletin
Date de publication :
2019-06
ISSN :
1545-2921
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Résumé en anglais : [en]
The paper analyzes the relations between the legal and regulatory production and the gains of popularity for the President and the Prime Minister in France. Using the GMM system estimation, we show that the Executive's ...
Lire la suite >The paper analyzes the relations between the legal and regulatory production and the gains of popularity for the President and the Prime Minister in France. Using the GMM system estimation, we show that the Executive's popularity depends on legislative activism, creating reasons to legislate frantically, but also that the Executive has strong incentives to strategically set the legislative agenda, possibly timing landmark laws during honeymoon periods. Moreover, if Prime Ministers can benefit actions taken in the last months of their term, this is not true for Presidents. Our results also confirm the traditional view, according to which incumbents are always bestowed with favorable ratings when the economic situation improves.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >The paper analyzes the relations between the legal and regulatory production and the gains of popularity for the President and the Prime Minister in France. Using the GMM system estimation, we show that the Executive's popularity depends on legislative activism, creating reasons to legislate frantically, but also that the Executive has strong incentives to strategically set the legislative agenda, possibly timing landmark laws during honeymoon periods. Moreover, if Prime Ministers can benefit actions taken in the last months of their term, this is not true for Presidents. Our results also confirm the traditional view, according to which incumbents are always bestowed with favorable ratings when the economic situation improves.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :