The effect of executive stock option delta ...
Type de document :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Titre :
The effect of executive stock option delta and vega on the spin-off decision
Auteur(s) :
Titre de la revue :
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
Éditeur :
Elsevier
Date de publication :
2018-11-08
ISSN :
1062-9769
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Spin-off
Divestiture
Stock option delta
Stock option vega
Executive compensation
Firm risk
Firm value
Divestiture
Stock option delta
Stock option vega
Executive compensation
Firm risk
Firm value
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management
Résumé en anglais : [en]
We investigate the role of CEO incentives around asset restructuring known as corporate spin-off. More specifically, we focus on executive stock option delta and vega vis-à-vis changes in firm value and firm riskiness in ...
Lire la suite >We investigate the role of CEO incentives around asset restructuring known as corporate spin-off. More specifically, we focus on executive stock option delta and vega vis-à-vis changes in firm value and firm riskiness in response to the corporate spin-off. Controlling for self-selection of the spin-off decision, we find that executive stock option vega is positively related to changes in firm value as well as changes in firm risk. Conversely, we find that executive stock option delta is negatively related to changes in firm value and firm risk. Finally, we estimate the Fazzari et al. (1988) investment model and show that at the business segment level, CEO incentives are positively linked to capital spending. Overall, our study extends the current literature by documenting the role of executive stock option delta and vega in the context of corporate spin-offs.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >We investigate the role of CEO incentives around asset restructuring known as corporate spin-off. More specifically, we focus on executive stock option delta and vega vis-à-vis changes in firm value and firm riskiness in response to the corporate spin-off. Controlling for self-selection of the spin-off decision, we find that executive stock option vega is positively related to changes in firm value as well as changes in firm risk. Conversely, we find that executive stock option delta is negatively related to changes in firm value and firm risk. Finally, we estimate the Fazzari et al. (1988) investment model and show that at the business segment level, CEO incentives are positively linked to capital spending. Overall, our study extends the current literature by documenting the role of executive stock option delta and vega in the context of corporate spin-offs.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :