Title :

Public versus private insurance system with (and without) transaction costs: optimal segmentation policy of an informed monopolist

Author(s) :

Braouezec, Yann [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]

Journal title :

Applied Economics

Pages :

1907-1928

Publisher :

Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

Publication date :

2018-10-13

ISSN :

0003-6846

English keyword(s) :

Insurance
direct segmentation
transaction costs
social welfare

HAL domain(s) :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

English abstract : [en]

Computer-mediated transactions allow insurance companies to customize their contracts, while transaction costs limit this tendency toward customization. To capture this phenomenon, we develop a complete-information framework ...
Show more >Computer-mediated transactions allow insurance companies to customize their contracts, while transaction costs limit this tendency toward customization. To capture this phenomenon, we develop a complete-information framework in which it is costly to design a new market segment when the segmentation policy (number and design of segments) is endogenously chosen. Both the case of a private and a public insurer are considered. Without transaction costs, these two insurance systems are equivalent in terms of social welfare and participation. With transaction costs, this equivalence is no longer present, and the analysis of this difference is the subject of this article.Show less >

Language :

Anglais

Peer reviewed article :

Oui

Audience :

Internationale

Popular science :

Non

Collections :

• Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL