Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development

Billette De Villemeur, Etienne; Ruble, Richard; Versaevel, Bruno

Type de document :

Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage

DOI :

10.1016/j.jedc.2018.11.009

Titre :

Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development

Auteur(s) :

Billette De Villemeur, Etienne [Auteur]

Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative [GREMAQ]
Ruble, Richard [Auteur]
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne [GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne]
EMLyon Business School [EM]
Versaevel, Bruno [Auteur]
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne [GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne]
EMLyon Business School [EM]

Titre de la revue :

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Pagination :

270-296

Éditeur :

Elsevier

Date de publication :

2019-03

ISSN :

0165-1889

Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :

Cost of imitation
Dynamic competition
Patent policy
Winner-take-all preemption

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

Résumé en anglais : [en]

We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development. If demand growth and volatility are high, attrition ...
Lire la suite >We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development. If demand growth and volatility are high, attrition occurs and IPRs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify. If demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive, IPRs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption, and possibly winner-take-all preemption. Moreover, the welfare achieved with optimal IPRs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined, illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition. In extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards, takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Vulgarisation :

Non

Collections :

Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL

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