Disentangling political and institutional ...
Type de document :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Titre :
Disentangling political and institutional determinants of budget forecast errors: A comparative approach
Auteur(s) :
Titre de la revue :
Journal of Comparative Economics
Éditeur :
Elsevier
Date de publication :
2018-04
ISSN :
0147-5967
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Fiscal forecasting
Opportunism
Elections
Institutions
Local governments
France
Portugal
Opportunism
Elections
Institutions
Local governments
France
Portugal
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Résumé en anglais : [en]
This paper provides a unique comparison between French and Portuguese local governments with respect to the nature and determinants of budget forecast errors. It starts by documenting and comparing their statistical ...
Lire la suite >This paper provides a unique comparison between French and Portuguese local governments with respect to the nature and determinants of budget forecast errors. It starts by documenting and comparing their statistical properties. The results point at biased and inefficient budget forecasts, which seem to have been more cautious in French departments than in Portuguese municipalities. Second, we examine the political, institutional and economic determinants of forecast biases. Overall, we find that they are essentially driven by electoral motivations and by institutional differences across the two countries. In particular, opportunistic forecasting is more prevalent where governments enjoy greater margin of maneuver, and there is evidence of conservatism in French departments where fiscal autonomy is greater.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >This paper provides a unique comparison between French and Portuguese local governments with respect to the nature and determinants of budget forecast errors. It starts by documenting and comparing their statistical properties. The results point at biased and inefficient budget forecasts, which seem to have been more cautious in French departments than in Portuguese municipalities. Second, we examine the political, institutional and economic determinants of forecast biases. Overall, we find that they are essentially driven by electoral motivations and by institutional differences across the two countries. In particular, opportunistic forecasting is more prevalent where governments enjoy greater margin of maneuver, and there is evidence of conservatism in French departments where fiscal autonomy is greater.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :
Fichiers
- http://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/bitstream/1822/66728/1/2018_MB_FV_JCE.pdf
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- 2018_MB_FV_JCE.pdf
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