Titre :

The cost of CEO duality: Evidence from French leadership compensation

Auteur(s) :

Broye, Géraldine [Auteur]
École de Management de Strasbourg = EM Strasbourg Business School [EM Strasbourg]
François, Abel [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Moulin, Yves [Auteur]
Centre Européen de Recherche en Economie Financière et Gestion des Entreprises [CEREFIGE]

Titre de la revue :

European Management Journal

Pagination :

336 - 350

Éditeur :

Elsevier

Date de publication :

2017-06

ISSN :

0263-2373

Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :

Corporate governance
Executive compensation
Duality
Chairperson of the board
France

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management

Résumé en anglais : [en]

This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between board leadership structures and executive compensation. According to agency theory, the combined position of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (COB) ...
Lire la suite >This paper aims to provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between board leadership structures and executive compensation. According to agency theory, the combined position of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (COB) entails greater compensation for the CEO in order to reduce conflicts of interest. In the literature, combined board structure is generally considered to generate additional costs for companies. However, the choice of two separate structures implies the payment of incentive compensation for the COB in addition to that defined for the CEO. This paper investigates the financial cost of duality when compensation packages are set for both leaders. Our results suggest that although combined board structure is associated with higher incentive compensation for the CEO, the overall compensation cost to the company is no higher when the chairperson's compensation is considered.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Vulgarisation :

Non

Collections :

• Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL