Blockholders' Ownership and Audit Fees: ...
Document type :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Title :
Blockholders' Ownership and Audit Fees: The Impact of the Corporate Governance Model
Author(s) :
Barroso, Raúl [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC [GREGH]
Ali, Chiraz Ben [Auteur]
Lesage, Cédric [Auteur]
Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC [GREGH]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC [GREGH]
Ali, Chiraz Ben [Auteur]
Lesage, Cédric [Auteur]
Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC [GREGH]
Journal title :
European Accounting Review
Pages :
149-172
Publication date :
2016-10-26
English keyword(s) :
governance models
shareholder model
stakeholder model
shareholder model
stakeholder model
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management
English abstract : [en]
This paper examines how two prominent corporate governance models, namely the shareholder and stakeholder models, have different effects on the relation between agency conflicts and the supply, and demand of audit services. ...
Show more >This paper examines how two prominent corporate governance models, namely the shareholder and stakeholder models, have different effects on the relation between agency conflicts and the supply, and demand of audit services. Shareholder (stakeholder) countries rely heavily on public (private) information to reduce information asymmetry for outside investors in the context of high (low) litigation risk. We expect audit fees to reflect the level of agency conflicts in shareholder countries as well as the needs for information of the major blockholders in stakeholder countries. Using a sample of 7982 firm-year observations from 19 countries, we find a U-shaped relation between controlling shareholding and audit fees for shareholder countries and an inverted U-shaped relation between controlling shareholding and audit fees for stakeholder countries. These results are consistent across different firm-level governance arrangements.Show less >
Show more >This paper examines how two prominent corporate governance models, namely the shareholder and stakeholder models, have different effects on the relation between agency conflicts and the supply, and demand of audit services. Shareholder (stakeholder) countries rely heavily on public (private) information to reduce information asymmetry for outside investors in the context of high (low) litigation risk. We expect audit fees to reflect the level of agency conflicts in shareholder countries as well as the needs for information of the major blockholders in stakeholder countries. Using a sample of 7982 firm-year observations from 19 countries, we find a U-shaped relation between controlling shareholding and audit fees for shareholder countries and an inverted U-shaped relation between controlling shareholding and audit fees for stakeholder countries. These results are consistent across different firm-level governance arrangements.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Popular science :
Non
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