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Taming The Shape Shifter: Detecting ...
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Document type :
Communication dans un congrès avec actes
Title :
Taming The Shape Shifter: Detecting Anti-fingerprinting Browsers
Author(s) :
Amin Azad, Babak [Auteur]
Department of Computer Science [Stonybrook - NY]
Starov, Oleksii [Auteur]
Palo Alto Networks
Laperdrix, Pierre [Auteur]
Self-adaptation for distributed services and large software systems [SPIRALS]
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Nikiforakis, Nick [Auteur]
Department of Computer Science [Stonybrook - NY]
Conference title :
DIMVA 2020 - 17th Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment
City :
Lisboa / Virtual
Country :
Portugal
Start date of the conference :
2020-06-24
HAL domain(s) :
Informatique [cs]/Web
Informatique [cs]/Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]
Informatique [cs]
English abstract : [en]
When it comes to leaked credentials and credit card information, we observe the development and use of anti-fingerprinting browsers by malicious actors. These tools are carefully designed to evade detection, often by ...
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When it comes to leaked credentials and credit card information, we observe the development and use of anti-fingerprinting browsers by malicious actors. These tools are carefully designed to evade detection, often by mimicking the browsing environment of the victim whose credentials were stolen. Even though these tools are popular in the underground markets, they have not received enough attention by researchers. In this paper, we report on the first evaluation of four underground, commercial, and research anti-fingerprinting browsers and highlight their high success rate in bypassing browser fingerprinting. Despite their success against well-known fingerprinting methods and libraries, we show that even slightest variation in the simulated fingerprint compared to the real ones can give away the presence of anti-fingerprinting tools. As a result, we provide techniques and fingerprint-based signatures that can be used to detect the current generation of anti-fingerprinting browsers.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Peer reviewed article :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Popular science :
Non
Collections :
  • Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille (CRIStAL) - UMR 9189
Source :
Harvested from HAL
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