Titre :

Teaming up and quiet intervention: The impact of institutional investors on executive compensation policies

Auteur(s) :

Mazur, Mieszko [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Salganik-Shoshan, Galla [Auteur]

Titre de la revue :

Journal of Financial Markets

Pagination :

65-83

Éditeur :

Elsevier

Date de publication :

2017-09

ISSN :

1386-4181

Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :

Institutional investors
Executive compensation
Strategic interactions
Executive pay disparity
Geography

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management

Résumé en anglais : [en]

In this paper, we investigate whether institutional investors intervene in firms in order to impact their incentive systems. We use metrics based on geographic distance between institutional investors as proxies for the ...
Lire la suite >In this paper, we investigate whether institutional investors intervene in firms in order to impact their incentive systems. We use metrics based on geographic distance between institutional investors as proxies for the intensity of their strategic interactions and plausible interventions. We find that when investors are geographically proximate to one another, firms tend to adopt executive compensation contracts that exhibit more performance-based mechanisms, higher incentives to expend managerial effort, and higher incentives to make risky and positive NPV policy choices. We also find that geographic distance between institutions is a significant determinant of the executive pay differentials.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Vulgarisation :

Non

Collections :

• Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL