Irrationality and Happiness

Billon, Alexandre

Type de document :

Article dans une revue scientifique

DOI :

10.26556/jesp.v11i1.108

Titre :

Irrationality and Happiness

Auteur(s) :

Billon, Alexandre [Auteur]
Savoirs, Textes, Langage (STL) - UMR 8163 [STL]

Titre de la revue :

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy

Pagination :

1-27

Éditeur :

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy

Date de publication :

2016-12-01

ISSN :

1559-3061

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie

Résumé en anglais : [en]

There is a long tradition in philosophy of blaming passions for our unhappiness. If only we were more rational, it is claimed, we would live happier lives. I argue that such optimism is misguided and that, paradoxically, ...
Lire la suite >There is a long tradition in philosophy of blaming passions for our unhappiness. If only we were more rational, it is claimed, we would live happier lives. I argue that such optimism is misguided and that, paradoxically, people with desires, like us, cannot be both happy and rational. More precisely, if someone rational has desires he will not be fully happy, and if he has some desires that are rational and – in a yet-to-be-specified sense – demanding, he will be frankly unhappy. Call this claim Rational Pessimism. The argument for Rational Pessimism can be considered as a variation on a Schopenhauerian argument that bluntly claims that, because desires involve lack and suffering, desiring souls like us cannot be happy. I argue that, even if Schopenhauer’s argument escapes most attacks that have been targeted against it, it faces decisive empirical objections. I argue that Schopenhauer’s argument can, however, be rescued if it is assumed that we are rational.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Comité de lecture :

Oui

Audience :

Internationale

Vulgarisation :

Non

Collections :