Softening and Hardening in the Iterated ...
Type de document :
Article dans une revue scientifique: Article original
Titre :
Softening and Hardening in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Auteur(s) :
Mathieu, Philippe [Auteur]
Université de Lille
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Delahaye, Jean-Paul [Auteur]
Université de Lille
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]

Université de Lille
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Delahaye, Jean-Paul [Auteur]
Université de Lille
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Titre de la revue :
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems
Pagination :
654 -- 663
Éditeur :
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Date de publication :
2023-01
ISSN :
2168-2216
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Cooperation
evolutionary simulation
game theory
social dilemma
evolutionary simulation
game theory
social dilemma
Discipline(s) HAL :
Informatique [cs]/Système multi-agents [cs.MA]
Informatique [cs]/Intelligence artificielle [cs.AI]
Informatique [cs]/Modélisation et simulation
Informatique [cs]/Intelligence artificielle [cs.AI]
Informatique [cs]/Modélisation et simulation
Résumé en anglais : [en]
This paper presents two methods to evaluate and draw distinction among general cooperative and aggressive strategic behavior in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). The first method identifies classes of strategies, ...
Lire la suite >This paper presents two methods to evaluate and draw distinction among general cooperative and aggressive strategic behavior in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). The first method identifies classes of strategies, clusters them into subclasses based on their cooperative or aggressive disposition, and then comprehensively assess their behavior. The second method relies on applying transformative manipulations that soften or harden strategies of a given set and compare them with the results obtained with the initial set. Although examined classes of initial strategies are very different, the results are stable and convergent. While our findings agree with the classical analyses of the IPD, the results are qualified and precise. Furthermore, the reproducibility of prior results via new experimental methods offer experimental evidence. The proposed comparative strategy analysis method is a new instrument that can have broad implications for analyzing games beyond the prisoner’s dilemma.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >This paper presents two methods to evaluate and draw distinction among general cooperative and aggressive strategic behavior in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). The first method identifies classes of strategies, clusters them into subclasses based on their cooperative or aggressive disposition, and then comprehensively assess their behavior. The second method relies on applying transformative manipulations that soften or harden strategies of a given set and compare them with the results obtained with the initial set. Although examined classes of initial strategies are very different, the results are stable and convergent. While our findings agree with the classical analyses of the IPD, the results are qualified and precise. Furthermore, the reproducibility of prior results via new experimental methods offer experimental evidence. The proposed comparative strategy analysis method is a new instrument that can have broad implications for analyzing games beyond the prisoner’s dilemma.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Comité de lecture :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
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