Softening and Hardening in the Iterated ...
Document type :
Article dans une revue scientifique
Title :
Softening and Hardening in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Author(s) :
Mathieu, Philippe [Auteur]
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Delahaye, Jean-Paul [Auteur]
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]

Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Delahaye, Jean-Paul [Auteur]
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Journal title :
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems
Pages :
654 -- 663
Publisher :
IEEE
Publication date :
2023-01
ISSN :
2168-2216
English keyword(s) :
Cooperation
evolutionary simulation
game theory
social dilemma
evolutionary simulation
game theory
social dilemma
HAL domain(s) :
Informatique [cs]/Système multi-agents [cs.MA]
Informatique [cs]/Intelligence artificielle [cs.AI]
Informatique [cs]/Modélisation et simulation
Informatique [cs]/Intelligence artificielle [cs.AI]
Informatique [cs]/Modélisation et simulation
English abstract : [en]
This paper presents two methods to evaluate and draw distinction among general cooperative and aggressive strategic behavior in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). The first method identifies classes of strategies, ...
Show more >This paper presents two methods to evaluate and draw distinction among general cooperative and aggressive strategic behavior in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). The first method identifies classes of strategies, clusters them into subclasses based on their cooperative or aggressive disposition, and then comprehensively assess their behavior. The second method relies on applying transformative manipulations that soften or harden strategies of a given set and compare them with the results obtained with the initial set. Although examined classes of initial strategies are very different, the results are stable and convergent. While our findings agree with the classical analyses of the IPD, the results are qualified and precise. Furthermore, the reproducibility of prior results via new experimental methods offer experimental evidence. The proposed comparative strategy analysis method is a new instrument that can have broad implications for analyzing games beyond the prisoner’s dilemma.Show less >
Show more >This paper presents two methods to evaluate and draw distinction among general cooperative and aggressive strategic behavior in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). The first method identifies classes of strategies, clusters them into subclasses based on their cooperative or aggressive disposition, and then comprehensively assess their behavior. The second method relies on applying transformative manipulations that soften or harden strategies of a given set and compare them with the results obtained with the initial set. Although examined classes of initial strategies are very different, the results are stable and convergent. While our findings agree with the classical analyses of the IPD, the results are qualified and precise. Furthermore, the reproducibility of prior results via new experimental methods offer experimental evidence. The proposed comparative strategy analysis method is a new instrument that can have broad implications for analyzing games beyond the prisoner’s dilemma.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Peer reviewed article :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Popular science :
Non
Collections :
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