• English
    • français
  • Help
  •  | 
  • Contact
  •  | 
  • About
  •  | 
  • Login
  • HAL portal
  •  | 
  • Pages Pro
  • EN
  •  / 
  • FR
View Item 
  •   LillOA Home
  • Liste des unités
  • Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221
  • View Item
  •   LillOA Home
  • Liste des unités
  • Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Punishing the weakest link - Voluntary ...
  • BibTeX
  • CSV
  • Excel
  • RIS

Document type :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
DOI :
10.1007/s11238-023-09931-1
Title :
Punishing the weakest link - Voluntary sanctions and efficient coordination in the minimum effort game
Author(s) :
Lec, Fabrice Le [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Matthey, Astrid [Auteur]
Rydval, Ondřej [Auteur]
Univerzita Karlova [Praha, Česká republika] = Charles University [Prague, Czech Republic] [UK]
Journal title :
Theory and Decision
Pages :
429–456
Publisher :
Springer Verlag
Publication date :
2023-06-06
ISSN :
0040-5833
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
English abstract : [en]
Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum-effort game. While most groups first experience Pareto inferior coordination in a ...
Show more >
Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum-effort game. While most groups first experience Pareto inferior coordination in a baseline treatment, the level of effort increases substantially once ex post sanctioning opportunities are introduced, that is, when one can assign costly punishment points to other group members to reduce their payoffs. We compare the effect of this voluntary punishment possibility with the effect of ex post costless communication, which in contrast to the punishment treatment increases efforts only temporarily and fails to bring the players to higher payoff equilibria permanently. Our results indicate that decentralized sanctions can play an important role as a coordination device in Pareto-ranked coordination settings. They also suggest that the motivations behind voluntary sanctions may be more general than usually put forth in the literature on cooperation games.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Popular science :
Non
Collections :
  • Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221
Source :
Harvested from HAL
Université de Lille

Mentions légales
Accessibilité : non conforme
Université de Lille © 2017