Modeling and Analysis of a Nonlinear ...
Document type :
Communication dans un congrès avec actes
Title :
Modeling and Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game with Mixed Armament
Author(s) :
Le Hénaff, Jean [Auteur]
CEA/DAM [Arpajon] [CEA/DAM]
Le Cadre, Hélène [Auteur]
Centre Inria de l'Université de Lille
Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure [INOCS]
CEA/DAM [Arpajon] [CEA/DAM]
Le Cadre, Hélène [Auteur]
Centre Inria de l'Université de Lille
Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure [INOCS]
Scientific editor(s) :
Springer LNCS
Conference title :
Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec)
City :
Avignon
Country :
France
Start date of the conference :
2023-10-18
English keyword(s) :
Security Game
Nash Equilibrium
Uniform Coercivity
Strategic Stability
Nash Equilibrium
Uniform Coercivity
Strategic Stability
HAL domain(s) :
Mathématiques [math]/Optimisation et contrôle [math.OC]
English abstract : [en]
We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of ...
Show more >We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of their sets of definition. Since we want to study the long-term effect of the Nations' investment in nuclear weapons, we focus on the steady-state analysis of the game. This requires us to extend the classical results from Rosen on compact-convex games, to unbounded convex games, relying on the coercivity property of the Nations' utility functions. In addition, we prove the existence and uniqueness, under mild assumptions, of an interior point Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. Simulations are performed in case of a duopoly, highlighting the efficiency loss reduction and stabilizing effect of nuclear armaments by comparison with the conventional-only setting.Show less >
Show more >We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of their sets of definition. Since we want to study the long-term effect of the Nations' investment in nuclear weapons, we focus on the steady-state analysis of the game. This requires us to extend the classical results from Rosen on compact-convex games, to unbounded convex games, relying on the coercivity property of the Nations' utility functions. In addition, we prove the existence and uniqueness, under mild assumptions, of an interior point Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. Simulations are performed in case of a duopoly, highlighting the efficiency loss reduction and stabilizing effect of nuclear armaments by comparison with the conventional-only setting.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Peer reviewed article :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Popular science :
Non
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