Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and ...
Type de document :
Article dans une revue scientifique
Titre :
Cross-jurisdictional income shifting and tax enforcement: evidence from public versus private multinationals
Auteur(s) :
Beuselinck, Christof [Auteur]
Lille - Economie et Management [LEM]
IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux]
Deloof, Marc [Auteur]
Vanstraelen, Ann [Auteur]
Lille - Economie et Management [LEM]
IÉSEG School Of Management [Puteaux]
Deloof, Marc [Auteur]
Vanstraelen, Ann [Auteur]
Titre de la revue :
Review of Accounting Studies
Pagination :
710--746
Éditeur :
Springer Verlag
Date de publication :
2014-10
ISSN :
1380-6653
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Tax planning
Income shifting
Tax enforcement
Composite tax score
Income shifting
Tax enforcement
Composite tax score
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management
Résumé en anglais : [en]
This paper examines the impact of tax enforcement and public listing status on income shifting by multinational corporations (MNCs). For a sample of over 8,000 subsidiaries that are majority-owned by 959 European MNCs over ...
Lire la suite >This paper examines the impact of tax enforcement and public listing status on income shifting by multinational corporations (MNCs). For a sample of over 8,000 subsidiaries that are majority-owned by 959 European MNCs over the period 1998–2009, we find strong evidence of income shifting from high to low tax countries and that income is shifted more out of high-tax countries when local tax enforcement is weak. In addition, we show that private MNCs exploit weak tax enforcement more to shift income out of the parent country compared to public MNCs. Combined, our results suggest that tax enforcement plays a crucial role in MNC income shifting decisions and that shifting is more aggressive when MNCs are less affected by nontax shifting costs as is the case in private MNCs.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >This paper examines the impact of tax enforcement and public listing status on income shifting by multinational corporations (MNCs). For a sample of over 8,000 subsidiaries that are majority-owned by 959 European MNCs over the period 1998–2009, we find strong evidence of income shifting from high to low tax countries and that income is shifted more out of high-tax countries when local tax enforcement is weak. In addition, we show that private MNCs exploit weak tax enforcement more to shift income out of the parent country compared to public MNCs. Combined, our results suggest that tax enforcement plays a crucial role in MNC income shifting decisions and that shifting is more aggressive when MNCs are less affected by nontax shifting costs as is the case in private MNCs.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Comité de lecture :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :
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