Euro White and Euro Yolk: Sovereign Debt ...
Type de document :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Titre :
Euro White and Euro Yolk: Sovereign Debt Structure Stability in the Eurozone
Auteur(s) :
Joliet, Robert [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Nessah, Rabia [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Nessah, Rabia [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Titre de la revue :
International Game Theory Review
Pagination :
1650004
Éditeur :
World Scientific Publishing
Date de publication :
2016-09
ISSN :
0219-1989
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
Eurozone
sovereign debt
yield spreads
nn-country game
coalition structure
coalitional equilibrium
sovereign debt
yield spreads
nn-country game
coalition structure
coalitional equilibrium
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Résumé en anglais : [en]
In this paper, we derive a cost-minimizing approach for governments in the eurozone that have to define their debt structure in terms of currency of issuance and maturity. We introduce and characterize the concept of ...
Lire la suite >In this paper, we derive a cost-minimizing approach for governments in the eurozone that have to define their debt structure in terms of currency of issuance and maturity. We introduce and characterize the concept of weighted coalitional αα-equilibrium to assure stability of two tiers of the eurozone, the stronger (White) countries and the weaker (Yolk) countries. The equilibrium presents both the Pareto optimality of the countries in each tier and the stability against any deviation of each subcoalition. In a practical way, it would require either strong political integration within each tier or considerable market pressure.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >In this paper, we derive a cost-minimizing approach for governments in the eurozone that have to define their debt structure in terms of currency of issuance and maturity. We introduce and characterize the concept of weighted coalitional αα-equilibrium to assure stability of two tiers of the eurozone, the stronger (White) countries and the weaker (Yolk) countries. The equilibrium presents both the Pareto optimality of the countries in each tier and the stability against any deviation of each subcoalition. In a practical way, it would require either strong political integration within each tier or considerable market pressure.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
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