Title :

Teaming up and quiet intervention: The impact of institutional investors on executive compensation policies

Author(s) :

Mazur, Mieszko [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Salganik-Shoshan, Galla [Auteur]

Journal title :

Journal of Financial Markets

Pages :

65-83

Publisher :

Elsevier

Publication date :

2017-09

ISSN :

1386-4181

English keyword(s) :

Institutional investors
Executive compensation
Strategic interactions
Executive pay disparity
Geography

HAL domain(s) :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management

English abstract : [en]

In this paper, we investigate whether institutional investors intervene in firms in order to impact their incentive systems. We use metrics based on geographic distance between institutional investors as proxies for the ...
Show more >In this paper, we investigate whether institutional investors intervene in firms in order to impact their incentive systems. We use metrics based on geographic distance between institutional investors as proxies for the intensity of their strategic interactions and plausible interventions. We find that when investors are geographically proximate to one another, firms tend to adopt executive compensation contracts that exhibit more performance-based mechanisms, higher incentives to expend managerial effort, and higher incentives to make risky and positive NPV policy choices. We also find that geographic distance between institutions is a significant determinant of the executive pay differentials.Show less >

Language :

Anglais

Popular science :

Non

Collections :

• Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL