Valuation and Matching: A Conventionalist ...
Document type :
Article dans une revue scientifique: Article original
Permalink :
Title :
Valuation and Matching: A Conventionalist Explanation of Labor Markets by Firms’ Recruitment Channels
Author(s) :
de Larquier, Guillemette [Auteur]
Centre Lillois d’Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques - UMR 8019 [CLERSÉ]
Centre Lillois d'Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques (CLERSE) - UMR 8019
Rieucau, G. [Auteur]
Centre d'études de l'emploi [CEE]
Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien [LED]
Centre Lillois d’Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques - UMR 8019 [CLERSÉ]
Centre Lillois d'Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques (CLERSE) - UMR 8019
Rieucau, G. [Auteur]
Centre d'études de l'emploi [CEE]
Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien [LED]
Journal title :
Historical Social Research
Volume number :
44
Pages :
52-72
Publication date :
2019-01
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
English abstract : [en]
In line with the conventionalist works on recruitment and intermediation in the labor market, this article argues that, in order to shape uncertainty about the quality of matching, recruitment channels used by firms rely ...
Show more >In line with the conventionalist works on recruitment and intermediation in the labor market, this article argues that, in order to shape uncertainty about the quality of matching, recruitment channels used by firms rely on “investments in forms.” The first investment corresponds to the definition of the boundaries of the labor market (i.e., the outline of the labor supply from the firm’s point of view); the second one corresponds to the format of information (i.e., the “standard” or “personalized” language used by channels to convey information). The firm’s resort to a given channel is explained by its internal organization and its valuation of what is a good applicant (depending on its “labor quality convention”). By crossing-over the two types of investment in forms, we distinguish four matching dynamics. Each type of dynamics is illustrated by examples coming from a qualitative survey of recruitment practices in four French service oriented sectors.Show less >
Show more >In line with the conventionalist works on recruitment and intermediation in the labor market, this article argues that, in order to shape uncertainty about the quality of matching, recruitment channels used by firms rely on “investments in forms.” The first investment corresponds to the definition of the boundaries of the labor market (i.e., the outline of the labor supply from the firm’s point of view); the second one corresponds to the format of information (i.e., the “standard” or “personalized” language used by channels to convey information). The firm’s resort to a given channel is explained by its internal organization and its valuation of what is a good applicant (depending on its “labor quality convention”). By crossing-over the two types of investment in forms, we distinguish four matching dynamics. Each type of dynamics is illustrated by examples coming from a qualitative survey of recruitment practices in four French service oriented sectors.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Français
Français
Audience :
Non spécifiée
Administrative institution(s) :
Université de Lille
CNRS
Univ. Littoral Côte d’Opale
CNRS
Univ. Littoral Côte d’Opale
Collections :
Submission date :
2019-03-19T08:13:07Z
2019-06-28T09:17:31Z
2019-07-16T14:47:05Z
2019-06-28T09:17:31Z
2019-07-16T14:47:05Z
Files
- HSR_44-1-2019_Larquier-Rieucau_Valuation and Matching.pdf
- Version éditeur
- Confidential access
- Access the document