On Stability of Nonlinear Armsbuilding Security Games

Le Hénaff, Jean; Boufaied, Jed; Le Cadre, Hélène

Type de document :

Pré-publication ou Document de travail

Titre :

On Stability of Nonlinear Armsbuilding Security Games

Auteur(s) :

Le Hénaff, Jean [Auteur]
CEA/DAM [Arpajon] [CEA/DAM]
Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille - UMR 9189 [CRIStAL]
Boufaied, Jed [Auteur]
Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure [INOCS]
Le Cadre, Hélène [Auteur]
Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure [INOCS]

Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :

Security Game
Nash Equilibrium
Uniform Coercivity
Learning in Games
Stability

Discipline(s) HAL :

Mathématiques [math]/Optimisation et contrôle [math.OC]

Résumé en anglais : [en]

We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of ...
Lire la suite >We formulate a security game in a context of mixed armament acquisition, involving a finite set of Nations in strategic relationship, with utility functions which are nonlinear and non-differentiable on the boundary of their sets of definition. Since we want to study the long-term effect of the Nations' investment in nuclear weapons, we focus on the steady-state analysis of the game. This requires us to extend the classical results from Rosen on compact-concave games, to unbounded concave games, relying on the uniform coercivity property of the Nations' utility functions. In addition, we prove the existence and uniqueness, under mild assumptions, of an interior point Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. To learn the interior point Nash Equilibrium, we provide a decentralized proximal point-type algorithm, and derive a closed form expression of its convergence rate. Simulations are performed in case of a duopoly, illustrating the utility improvement and stabilizing effects of nuclear armaments, by comparison with the conventional-only setting. We subsequently generalize this result to an arbitrarily large, but finite, number of Nations. The problem is extended further by allowing arms trades between Nations, split into suppliers on the one side, and recipients-interpreted as opponents-on the other side. It is widely recognized that arms trades can have negative externalities on the supplier Nations' security, and there are benefits to cooperate. Forming an export coalition enables the socialization of the operational costs among the coalition members and reallocation according to an ex-post cost allocation mechanism, while ensuring the maximization of the sum of the coalition members' security functions. For a given coalition structure, we develop a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a market equilibrium in arms trade prices and supply. Finally, we derive conditions on the exports, arms trade prices, and cost allocation mechanism guaranteeing the stability of the export coalition, thus highlighting the viability of a common defense policy for the export coalition.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Collections :

Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille (CRIStAL) - UMR 9189

Source :

Harvested from HAL

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