Titre :

Rigidity in public contracts: Implications for renewal dynamics

Auteur(s) :

Moszoro, Marian [Auteur]
George Mason University [Fairfax]
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Saussier, Stéphane [Auteur]
LAB IAE Paris - Sorbonne
Beuve, Jean [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]

Titre de la revue :

Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

Pagination :

101924

Éditeur :

Elsevier

Date de publication :

2024-12

ISSN :

1062-9769

Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :

Public procurement
Contract rigidity
Renewals
Renegotiations

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

Résumé en anglais : [en]

We investigate how the rigidity of public contracts influences the frequency of their renewal. Using a dataset of contracts for public–private car parks and employing machine-reading techniques to assess contract rigidity, ...
Lire la suite >We investigate how the rigidity of public contracts influences the frequency of their renewal. Using a dataset of contracts for public–private car parks and employing machine-reading techniques to assess contract rigidity, we find that heightened contract rigidity, particularly in litigation clauses, significantly raises the probability of contract renewal. Our findings indicate that procedural sunk costs and the competitive advantage conferred to incumbents by contract rigidity are key factors contributing to more frequent renewals. This study enhances our comprehension of public contract renewals by emphasizing the significance of political contestability and rigidity, providing valuable insights into optimal strategies for contract renegotiation.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Comité de lecture :

Oui

Audience :

Internationale

Vulgarisation :

Non

Collections :

• Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL

Date de dépôt :

2025-01-22T03:12:59Z