Strategic fire-sales and price-mediated ...
Document type :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Title :
Strategic fire-sales and price-mediated contagion in the banking system
Author(s) :
Braouezec, Yann [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Wagalath, Lakshithe [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Wagalath, Lakshithe [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Journal title :
European Journal of Operational Research
Pages :
1180-1197
Publisher :
Elsevier
Publication date :
2019-05
ISSN :
0377-2217
English keyword(s) :
Finance Price-mediated contagion Nash equilibrium with strategic Complementarities CCAR 2015 Macro-prudential stress-tests
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
English abstract : [en]
We consider a price-mediated contagion framework in which each bank, after an exogenous shock, may have to sell assets in order to comply with regulatory constraints. Interaction between banks takes place only through price ...
Show more >We consider a price-mediated contagion framework in which each bank, after an exogenous shock, may have to sell assets in order to comply with regulatory constraints. Interaction between banks takes place only through price impact. We characterize the equilibrium of the strategic deleveraging problem and we calibrate our model to publicly-available data, the US banks that were part of the 2015 regulatory stress-tests. We then consider a more sophisticated model in which each bank is exposed to two risky assets (marketable and not marketable) and is only able to sell the marketable asset. We calibrate our model using the six banks with significant trading operations and we show that, depending on the price impact, the contagion of failures may be significant. Our results may be used to refine current stress testing frameworks by incorporating potential contagion mechanisms between banks.Show less >
Show more >We consider a price-mediated contagion framework in which each bank, after an exogenous shock, may have to sell assets in order to comply with regulatory constraints. Interaction between banks takes place only through price impact. We characterize the equilibrium of the strategic deleveraging problem and we calibrate our model to publicly-available data, the US banks that were part of the 2015 regulatory stress-tests. We then consider a more sophisticated model in which each bank is exposed to two risky assets (marketable and not marketable) and is only able to sell the marketable asset. We calibrate our model using the six banks with significant trading operations and we show that, depending on the price impact, the contagion of failures may be significant. Our results may be used to refine current stress testing frameworks by incorporating potential contagion mechanisms between banks.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Popular science :
Non
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