The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering ...
Type de document :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
DOI :
Titre :
The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency
Auteur(s) :
Farvaque, Etienne [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie [EQUIPPE]
Mihailov, Alexander [Auteur]
University of Reading [UOR]
Naghavi, Alireza [Auteur]
Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna = University of Bologna [UNIBO]

Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie [EQUIPPE]
Mihailov, Alexander [Auteur]
University of Reading [UOR]
Naghavi, Alireza [Auteur]
Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna = University of Bologna [UNIBO]
Titre de la revue :
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Pagination :
707-742
Éditeur :
Mohr Siebeck
Date de publication :
2018-12
ISSN :
0932-4569
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Résumé en anglais : [en]
This paper examines how the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology plays a role in the rise and fall of communism. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents ...
Lire la suite >This paper examines how the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology plays a role in the rise and fall of communism. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and model their conflict in ideology, triggered by envy. The socioeconomic dynamics generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized as leading to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency. The model also derives conditions under which the two systems converge and become stable.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >This paper examines how the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences transmitted by ideology plays a role in the rise and fall of communism. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents and model their conflict in ideology, triggered by envy. The socioeconomic dynamics generate a pendulum-like switch from markets to a centrally planned economy abolishing private ownership, and back to restoring market incentives. The grand experiment of communism is thus characterized as leading to the discovery of a trade-off between equality and efficiency. The model also derives conditions under which the two systems converge and become stable.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
Source :
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