The burden of attention: CEO publicity and ...
Document type :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Title :
The burden of attention: CEO publicity and tax avoidance
Author(s) :
Duan, Tinghua [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Ding, Rong [Auteur]
Hou, Wenxuan [Auteur]
Zhang, John Ziyang [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Ding, Rong [Auteur]
Hou, Wenxuan [Auteur]
Zhang, John Ziyang [Auteur]
Journal title :
Journal of Business Research
Pages :
90-101
Publisher :
Elsevier
Publication date :
2018-06
ISSN :
0148-2963
English keyword(s) :
CEO publicity
CEOs
Tax rate
Google trends
Search volume index
Tax avoidance
CEOs
Tax rate
Google trends
Search volume index
Tax avoidance
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management
English abstract : [en]
We use search volume index (SVI) for a CEO's name and stock ticker from Google Trends to measure CEO publicity, and examine the competing hypotheses on its relation to tax avoidance. On the one hand, CEOs who receive more ...
Show more >We use search volume index (SVI) for a CEO's name and stock ticker from Google Trends to measure CEO publicity, and examine the competing hypotheses on its relation to tax avoidance. On the one hand, CEOs who receive more attention from retail investors may engage in tax evasion activities to meet investors' performance expectations; on the other hand, they are more concerned with public image and avoiding being labeled as tax avoiders. Based on the CEOs of S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2011, our finding supports the former and shows that CEOs with higher publicity manage to have a lower effective tax rate and cash effective tax rate. Such effect is moderated by board independence. Finally, firms with higher CEO publicity pay auditors higher tax fees, suggesting that these CEOs tend to use more tax planning services from auditors.Show less >
Show more >We use search volume index (SVI) for a CEO's name and stock ticker from Google Trends to measure CEO publicity, and examine the competing hypotheses on its relation to tax avoidance. On the one hand, CEOs who receive more attention from retail investors may engage in tax evasion activities to meet investors' performance expectations; on the other hand, they are more concerned with public image and avoiding being labeled as tax avoiders. Based on the CEOs of S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2011, our finding supports the former and shows that CEOs with higher publicity manage to have a lower effective tax rate and cash effective tax rate. Such effect is moderated by board independence. Finally, firms with higher CEO publicity pay auditors higher tax fees, suggesting that these CEOs tend to use more tax planning services from auditors.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Popular science :
Non
Collections :
Source :
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