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The burden of attention: CEO publicity and ...
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Type de document :
Article dans une revue scientifique
DOI :
10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.02.010
URL permanente :
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12210/56626
Titre :
The burden of attention: CEO publicity and tax avoidance
Auteur(s) :
Duan, Tinghua [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Ding, Rong [Auteur]
Hou, Wenxuan [Auteur]
Zhang, John Ziyang [Auteur]
Titre de la revue :
Journal of Business Research
Pagination :
90-101
Éditeur :
Elsevier
Date de publication :
2018-06
ISSN :
0148-2963
Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :
CEO publicity
CEOs
Tax rate
Google trends
Search volume index
Tax avoidance
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management
Résumé en anglais : [en]
We use search volume index (SVI) for a CEO's name and stock ticker from Google Trends to measure CEO publicity, and examine the competing hypotheses on its relation to tax avoidance. On the one hand, CEOs who receive more ...
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We use search volume index (SVI) for a CEO's name and stock ticker from Google Trends to measure CEO publicity, and examine the competing hypotheses on its relation to tax avoidance. On the one hand, CEOs who receive more attention from retail investors may engage in tax evasion activities to meet investors' performance expectations; on the other hand, they are more concerned with public image and avoiding being labeled as tax avoiders. Based on the CEOs of S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2011, our finding supports the former and shows that CEOs with higher publicity manage to have a lower effective tax rate and cash effective tax rate. Such effect is moderated by board independence. Finally, firms with higher CEO publicity pay auditors higher tax fees, suggesting that these CEOs tend to use more tax planning services from auditors.Lire moins >
Langue :
Anglais
Comité de lecture :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
  • Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221
Source :
Harvested from HAL
Date de dépôt :
2021-11-13T01:53:54Z
Fichiers
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  • http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/98466/7/WRAP-burden-attention-publicity-tax-avoidance-Ding-2018.pdf
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