Porque somos y no somos dioses: Leibniz, ...
Type de document :
Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage
Titre :
Porque somos y no somos dioses: Leibniz, Descartes y contraLógicos
Auteur(s) :
Titre de la revue :
Eidos
Pagination :
10-38
Éditeur :
Universidad del Norte
Date de publication :
2011-10-22
ISSN :
2011-7477
Discipline(s) HAL :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Philosophie
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Histoire, Philosophie et Sociologie des sciences
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Histoire, Philosophie et Sociologie des sciences
Résumé en anglais : [en]
The main aim of the present paper is to understand the debate between Descartes and Leibniz about eternal truths as providing the structure of several possible dialogues involving counter-logic. According to this analysis ...
Lire la suite >The main aim of the present paper is to understand the debate between Descartes and Leibniz about eternal truths as providing the structure of several possible dialogues involving counter-logic. According to this analysis the positions of Descartes and Leibniz are understood as constituting dual and dynamic perspectives in relation to the availability of some specific choices that should provide norms of rationality. Each of these dialogues has both a universal, monological aspect (given by the winning strategy) and a contextual, dialogical one (given by the play level). I conclude with the suggestion that a notion of rationality that contains both the universal and the contextual aspects does not yield a specific logic, but rather a frame of normative rationality. The conception of such a frame seems to be closely linked to the notion of a universal perfectible language discussed by Olga Pombo. The central idea is that the Leibniz's notion of rationality is a fondateur de discursivité if we use Marcelo Dascal´s quote of Foucault.Lire moins >
Lire la suite >The main aim of the present paper is to understand the debate between Descartes and Leibniz about eternal truths as providing the structure of several possible dialogues involving counter-logic. According to this analysis the positions of Descartes and Leibniz are understood as constituting dual and dynamic perspectives in relation to the availability of some specific choices that should provide norms of rationality. Each of these dialogues has both a universal, monological aspect (given by the winning strategy) and a contextual, dialogical one (given by the play level). I conclude with the suggestion that a notion of rationality that contains both the universal and the contextual aspects does not yield a specific logic, but rather a frame of normative rationality. The conception of such a frame seems to be closely linked to the notion of a universal perfectible language discussed by Olga Pombo. The central idea is that the Leibniz's notion of rationality is a fondateur de discursivité if we use Marcelo Dascal´s quote of Foucault.Lire moins >
Langue :
Espagnol
Vulgarisation :
Non
Collections :
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