Global Supply Chain Sustainability: the Role of Non-governmental Enforcement Mechanisms

Limardi, Michela; Battista, Francesca

Type de document :

Autre communication scientifique (congrès sans actes - poster - séminaire...)

Titre :

Global Supply Chain Sustainability: the Role of Non-governmental Enforcement Mechanisms

Auteur(s) :

Limardi, Michela [Auteur]

Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Management et Économie Lab - ULR 7396 [RIME-Lab]
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne [CES]
Battista, Francesca [Auteur]

Éditeur :

Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne (CES - UMR8174)

Date de publication :

2022-06-17

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

Résumé en anglais : [en]

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) exert pressure on multinational enterprises (MNE) to force the application of social and environmental standards for subcontractors in developing countries. Non-governmental regulation ...
Lire la suite >Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) exert pressure on multinational enterprises (MNE) to force the application of social and environmental standards for subcontractors in developing countries. Non-governmental regulation relies on voluntary standards defined by the NGOs,or by the MNE themselves. This leads to an uncertainty and social regulation. In this respect, external pressure from NGOs constitutes a reputational risk for the company. MNEs, in turn, try to manage those risks by increasingly monitoring the environmental and social impact of their global suppliers. Two forms of non-governmental enforcement currently prevail: warning (i.e.disclosing information of a violation to the company) versus immediate punishment (i.e. penalizing a company without disclosing information). A theoretical model is developed to determine whether disclosing (or not) information to the MNE about reputational risk is more effective. The results demonstrate that MNEs with a low reputation (or a high degree of out-sourcing) will have a higher incentive to conduct inspections of its global suppliers in a warning regime. Conversely, when MNE visibility is high, disclosing information in advance does not provide additional incentives.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Vulgarisation :

Non

Commentaire :

URL des Documents de travail : https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr/publications/

Collections :

Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Management et Économie Lab (RIME-Lab) - ULR 7396

Source :

Harvested from HAL

Fichiers

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03704334/document
Accès libre
Accéder au document

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03704334/document
Accès libre
Accéder au document

document
Accès libre
Accéder au document

22013.pdf
Accès libre
Accéder au document

document
Accès libre
Accéder au document

22013.pdf
Accès libre
Accéder au document

Global Supply Chain Sustainability: the ... BibTeX CSV Excel RIS

Fichiers

Global Supply Chain Sustainability: the ...

BibTeX

CSV

Excel

RIS