ON THE STRONG HYBRID SOLUTION OF AN N-PERSON GAME
Document type :
Article dans une revue scientifique: Article original
Title :
ON THE STRONG HYBRID SOLUTION OF AN N-PERSON GAME
Author(s) :
Crettez, Bertrand [Auteur]
Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit [CRED]
Nessah, Rabia [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Tazdaït, Tarik [Auteur]
Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement [CIRED]
Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit [CRED]
Nessah, Rabia [Auteur]

Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Tazdaït, Tarik [Auteur]
Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement [CIRED]
Journal title :
Mathematical Social Sciences
Pages :
61-68
Publisher :
Elsevier
Publication date :
2022-05
ISSN :
0165-4896
English keyword(s) :
hybrid solution
strong hybrid solution
N -Person Game coalition structure hybrid solution strong hybrid solution
N -Person Game
coalition structure
strong hybrid solution
N -Person Game coalition structure hybrid solution strong hybrid solution
N -Person Game
coalition structure
HAL domain(s) :
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
English abstract : [en]
We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibrium, the strong hybrid solution, which is a refinement of Zhao's hybrid solution. It is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where ...
Show more >We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibrium, the strong hybrid solution, which is a refinement of Zhao's hybrid solution. It is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another. In the strong hybrid solution, as opposed to the hybrid solution, the strategy profile assigned to each coalition is strongly Pareto optimal. We show that there exists a strong hybrid solution whenever preferences are partially quasi-transferable.Show less >
Show more >We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibrium, the strong hybrid solution, which is a refinement of Zhao's hybrid solution. It is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another. In the strong hybrid solution, as opposed to the hybrid solution, the strategy profile assigned to each coalition is strongly Pareto optimal. We show that there exists a strong hybrid solution whenever preferences are partially quasi-transferable.Show less >
Language :
Anglais
Peer reviewed article :
Oui
Audience :
Internationale
Popular science :
Non
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