The stickiness of norms

Farrow, Katherine; Romaniuc, Rustam

Type de document :

Compte-rendu et recension critique d'ouvrage

DOI :

10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010

Titre :

The stickiness of norms

Auteur(s) :

Farrow, Katherine [Auteur]
EconomiX [EconomiX]
Romaniuc, Rustam [Auteur]

Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]

Titre de la revue :

International Review of Law and Economics

Pagination :

54-62

Éditeur :

Elsevier [1981-....]

Date de publication :

2019-06

ISSN :

0144-8188

Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :

Social norms
Peer punishment
Saving face
Cooperation

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

Résumé en anglais : [en]

In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions ...
Lire la suite >In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions in which a prosocial norm of cooperation is enforced via either anonymous peer punishment or face-saving concerns. In two test treatments, we introduce to these social environments an external regulation that is implemented for a limited period of time and then removed. We observe a significant negative post-intervention effect of this removal in the context of peer disapproval, but no such effect in the context of face-saving concerns. Our findings reveal the importance of the type of norm-enforcement mechanism in determining the robustness of norm adherence in the long term.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Vulgarisation :

Non

Collections :