Titre :

ON THE STRONG HYBRID SOLUTION OF AN N-PERSON GAME

Auteur(s) :

Crettez, Bertrand [Auteur]
Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit [CRED]
Nessah, Rabia [Auteur]
Lille économie management - UMR 9221 [LEM]
Tazdaït, Tarik [Auteur]
Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement [CIRED]

Titre de la revue :

Mathematical Social Sciences

Pagination :

61-68

Éditeur :

Elsevier

Date de publication :

2022-05

ISSN :

0165-4896

Mot(s)-clé(s) en anglais :

hybrid solution
strong hybrid solution
N -Person Game coalition structure hybrid solution strong hybrid solution
N -Person Game
coalition structure

Discipline(s) HAL :

Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances

Résumé en anglais : [en]

We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibrium, the strong hybrid solution, which is a refinement of Zhao's hybrid solution. It is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where ...
Lire la suite >We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibrium, the strong hybrid solution, which is a refinement of Zhao's hybrid solution. It is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another. In the strong hybrid solution, as opposed to the hybrid solution, the strategy profile assigned to each coalition is strongly Pareto optimal. We show that there exists a strong hybrid solution whenever preferences are partially quasi-transferable.Lire moins >

Langue :

Anglais

Comité de lecture :

Oui

Audience :

Internationale

Vulgarisation :

Non

Collections :

• Lille Économie Management (LEM) - UMR 9221

Source :

Harvested from HAL